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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GERTRUDE GIBBS,
LYNN P. GIBBS and
G.A.YE GIBBS SMITH,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 7710

vs.
BLUE CAB, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR
REHEARI~G A~D

BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The respondent, Blue Cab, Inc., a corporation, petitions the Court for a rehearing and reargument of the
above entitled case upon the following grounds:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINT I.
THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE RECORD IN THIS
CASE, AND HAS FAILED TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE
PERMISSIBLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE
RECORD, AND ITS DECISION, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE
RECALLED AND THE CASE REHEARD.
POINT II.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFUSION
AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INTERSECTION LAW OF THIS STATE, AND THE DECISION,
THEREFORE, SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE CASE
REHEARD.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the judgment
and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument
be permitted of the entire case.
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith.
SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW

By

_5?('~ /v %-,_..s---u
---------3-~:h~-ii~-s~~~---------------------------Attorneys for Respondent.

JOHN II. SNOW hereby certifies that he is one
of the attorneys for respondent and petitioner herein,
and that in his opinion there is good cause to believe
that the judgment and decision of the Court is erroneous
and that the case should be reheard and reargued as
prayed for in said petition.
Dated this 9th day of December, 1952.
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BRIEF I~ SUPPORT OF
PETITIO~

FOR REHEARING
POINT I.

THE COURT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE RECORD IN THIS
CASE, AND HAS FAILED TO GIVE WEIGHT TO THE
PERJIISSIBLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE
RECORD, AND ITS DECISION, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE .
RECALLED AND THE CASE REHEARD.

There appears to be no need for a restatement of
the facts of this case at this time inasmuch as the facts
were throughly outlined and discussed in the original
briefs and upon oral argument. The decision of the
Court, however, indicates that the facts have been
misconstrued and misapplied, and the Court has either
ignored or minimized the effect of the logical and permissible inferences which should be drawn from the
facts in order that a just and proper decision be rendered.

The Court's decision appears to consist of a holding,
first, that the question of whether or not the negligence
of decedent, in not having a lighted lamp upon his
bicycle, was contributory negligence, was a question of
fact for the jury, and second, a holding which lumps the
questions of other acts of negligence on the part of
decedent and the negligence of defendant, if any, into
one package to be submitted to and considered by the
jury. Practically no reference is made in the decision
to the other elements of negligence on the part of decedSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ent, and the question of negligence of defendant, if any,
is disposed of with a passing comrnent. We shall first
discuss the question of the unlighted bicycle.
The bicycle of decedent had no light as required
by law. Title 57-7-154, Utah Code Annotated, 1943;
Section 27E2, Ogden City Ordinances. It seems to be
conceded that the absence of the lamp was negligence,
per se. The next question, obviously, is whether that
negligence contributed to the cause of the accident to
the extent that the appellants would be barred from
recovery, as a matter of law. The Court, in the majority
opinion, passes lightly over the problem with the comment that this is a jury question, particularly because
of the fact that "immediately prior to the time of impact
the bicycle, and therefore the lamp, was pointed away
from the vision of the defendant ... ''
From this comment, it would seem that the Court
has failed to consider the effect of the fact that decedent
and his bicycle, in the many seconds prior to impact,
were mere shadowy shapes in the darkness, if, in fact,
they were visible at all. Since there was no lamp, there
was no indication of their presence at the sidewalk line,
the stop sign area, the curb line, or at any place in the
northerly half of the intersection. It is just this situation
that the statutes involved were designed to 'prevent. If
there had been a lamp, the defendant would have been
warned in ample time to have avoided the accident.
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Why was the bicyele wheel turned~ It was turned to
avoid the impact, just as the defendant's cab was turned.
At that time, it was too late to give any warning. The
negligence of the decedent had borne fruit. The accident
was about to happen. That the front of the bicycle was
then turned away fron1 the vision of the defendant is
absolutely immaterial. The danger foreseen ·by the
framers of the statute and ordinance had already
materialized.
If the decedent had had a light upon his bicycle, the
rays from that light would have been seen either as he
passed the sidewalk line, or passed the stop sign· area,
and curb line, and entered into the north half of the
intersection. Even if the bicycle had been pointed away
from the taxicab in the area near the point of impact,
the rays from the lamp could have been seen upon the
darkened street, or reflected from the wet surface of
the road. The cab driver, from the time he left Adams
Avenue, one block to the west, would 4ave had the
opportunity to see a light at one or the other of the
indicated points, and thus, would have had the opportunity to take steps to avoid the collision. He would not
have been placed in the position of attempting, at the
last moment, to avoid an accident which had been made
inevitable by the carelessness of the bicyclist.
The Court, however, avoids discussion of those facts
and inferences by stating that what the bicyclist did,
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prior to impact, is ''relegated inescapably to the realm
of conjecture.'' By this statement, we assume .the Court
means that it cannot be determined with certainty
whether the decedent rode his bicycle, walked with it,
or was standing in the middle of the intersection with it.
Even if this be true, we fail to see how it can benefit
appellant's case. A man who rides a bicycle without a
light into a through street, into the path of an on-coming
vehicle, is negligent. If he walks with his bicycle "\vithout
a light, and into the path of a vehicle, he is negligent.
If he stands in the middle of a street, in the path of a
vehicle, he is negligent. That this decedent did at least
o~e of these things is inescapable. He had to get to the
point of impact some way.
No matter which of the choices is utilized, the
absence of the light is still a dominant factor in the
happening of the accident. It would be difficult to conceive of a situation better designed to illustrate the
wisdom of the law requiring a light upon a bicycle. To
say tha·t such ·a law is a wise law, but then to say, in
the same breath, that a jury might reasonably find that
the violation of the law, under these facts, is of no
legal consequence, is to render the law meaningless.
If this case is tried anew and submitted to the jury,
as it necessarily would be under the Court's decision, it
is not difficult to imagine the bewilderment of the members of the jury when they are told that the conduct of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the decedent was negligent and a Yiolation of the law,
on the one hand, but that, on the other hand, maybe it
didn't n1ake any difference, after all.
A fair appraisal of the Court's holding on the
question of the unlighted bicycle leads unavoidably to
the conclusion that the decision gives undue emphasis
to the fact that the bicycle ''Tas turned away from the
cab driver just before impact, and fails to consider the
effect of the absence of the light prior to that time,
and fails to consider the effect and meaning of the
statutory enactments upon this subject.
The majority opinion of the Court, it seems to us,
has failed to give adequate consideration to another
factor in this case. There seems to be no escape from the
conclusion that the decedent was contributorily negligent
by placing himself in the intersection at the time and in
the manner which he did in this case. We do not urge,
as indicated by the Court, that" anyone killed or injured
in an intersection ... of necessity must have been guilty
of some carelessness contributing to the mishap." However, no adequate answer has yet been heard to the
question posed by Counsel upon oral argument of this
case to the effect that, if decedent was acting with due
care, how could he have arrived at the center of this
intersection in the face of the on-coming taxicab~
The Court recognizes that there was clear visibility
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for a block from the scene of the accident, as found by
the trial court after inspection of the scene. The Court,
however, atternpts to minimize the effect of the personal
inspection by stating that it was made ''on an ordinary
day when factors of darkness, wetness, rain, mist, etc.
were absent.'' What possible difference the absence of
these factors could mean to this case is nowhere made
clear. If anything, the presence of these factors at the
time of the accident makes it even more clear that decedent was guilty of negligence. This is so because the
doctrine of the reasonable man requires the exercise
of more care under such circumstances than is required
on a bright, clear, dry day. Likewise, there is nothing
in the factors of darkness, wetness, rain or mist, which
rnakes headlights become less visible to a bicyclist. If
anything, these factors make the headlights more prominent because the reflection from the headlights is multiplied a thousandfold as the rays of light strike droplets
of water in the air and the wet planes and surfaces of
the street ahead of the taxicab. Further, in a drizzle
such as was present on this occasion the sound of the
vehicle is .much more apparent to an average person
because of the noise of the tires upon the wet pavement
than is the case when dry tires move upon dry pavement.
If there was ever a case where it can be said with
legal certainty that an accident occurred because of the
fault of one of the participants, this is that case. Nothing
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in the majority decision of the Court discloses how reasonable men could possibly differ on the question of
decedent's negligence. A jury of such men might disagree
in that some of its members might find decedent negligent because he entered the intersection 'Without looking.
Others might find that he looked but failed to heed what
he saw. Still others might find that he ran through
the stop sign, or that he entered a through street at a
time when another vehicle was approaching so close as to
constitute a hazard. Still others might find he was standing in the iniddle of the street with the bicycle with no
lamp upon it on a dark and rainy morning, and finally,
others might find that he did one or two or three, or all
of these things. But, whatever such a jury found,
whether it be one or more, or all, o.f these things in
combination, we cannot see how any jury could find
that none of these factors, either singly or in combination, failed to have a contributing effect upon this accident. Such a contention reduces the law to an absurdity
and renders meaningless the statutes concerning lights
upon vehicles and rights of way at through-highway
intersections, and destroys the effect of the statutes and
decisions of this state which place the same burden of
care upon a bicyclist as is placed upon a motorist.
The decision of the Court apparently gives . little
weight to the numerous specifications of negligence on
the part of decedent, and disposes of all of them by
stating that the jury "may have determined that
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deceased acted as an ordinary prudent person in failing
to appraise accurately the proximity of the cab, or its
speed, so as reasonably to have misjudged his ability to
clear the intersection in safety.'' Thus the Court states
that a jury could absolve decedent from the charge of
contributory negligence even if the jury found that Mr.
Gibbs failed to stop for the stop sign, failed to look
for on-coming traffic, or having looked, failed to heed
what he saw, all such failures apparently being excused
because of the possibility that Mr. Gibbs might have misjudged the situation in which he found himself.
In so holding, however, the Court overlooks the
question already discussed, namely, that the deceased
had no light upon his bicycle. That is an element of
negligence which cannot be excused on the ground of
poor judgment. It is an element that is constant in the
case and bears upon each and all of the other elements
of negligence. It acted in concert with the other acts of
negligence on the part of deceased.
Logically it is of no avail to plaintiff to argue that
there is no proof that Gibbs was riding the bicycle.
While the Court apparently paid little heed to the argument respondent advanced upon the original hearing
of this case to the effect that the inferences to be drawn
from the physical facts pointed inescapably to the fact
that decedent was riding the bicycle, there is still another
fact not previously discussed which bears out this point.
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If, as has been suggested by appellant, in a pure afterthought, the decedent was standing in the street with
his bicycle, or was walking with it, then there is no
explanation for the sudden turn of the wheel of the
bicycle to the left of decedent. The natural and logical
thing for a person to do if he was walking or pushing
a bicycle and suddenly became aware of a car bearing
down upon him, would be to step back to safety, or to
rush blindly ahead, but it would not be a natural reflex
for him to turn the wheel of the ·bicycle, as apparently
\\·as done in this case. This point is urged because it
is important in the consideration of whether or not·
decedent acted as an ordinary and prudent man, and
whether or not he should be charged with the same
degree of care as is a motorist under the laws of this
state.
Any attempt now to justify plaintiff's position upon
the ground that decedent was not riding his bicycle
is to refuse to give weight to the inferences which
should be drawn from the facts and gives weight to
inferences which can be based upon no fact at all.

By its holding in this case the Court has said that
even in the face of all of these acts of negligence there
still must be submitted to a jury the question ·of whether
or not the negligent acts and omissions contributed to the
cause of the accident. To say that a jury of reasonable
men could examine this record, consider these facts
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of negligence, draw the logical inferences from the facts,
and in the light of ordinary experience find deceased
not guilty of contributory negligence, is to defy reason
and logic and to mock the experience of the ordinary
individual who sits upon the jury. Such a decision allows
and invites a jury to enter into "the realm of conjecture,'' and there to speculate and search out reasons
why conduct, which is ordinarily and almost without
exception considered negligent, should not be said to be
negligence sufficient to bar recovery in this case.
POINT II.
THE DECISION OF THE COURT RESULTS IN CONFUSION
AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INTERSECTION LAW OF THIS STATE, AND THE DECISION,
THEREFORE, SHOULD BE RECALLED AND THE CASE
REHEARD.

A source of particular disturbance to Counsel is
that portion of the majority decision of the Court wherein
it is confessed that the law of intersection cases is so confused that no longer can reliance be placed upon the
earlier decisions of the Court. It is stated that since
no two cases "possibly could present analogous facts,"
henceforth the Court must analyze each case upon its own
facts, without regard to precedents.
It is submitted that such a course of action flies in
the teeth of the doctrine of stare decisis, upon which
much of the structure of Anglo-Saxon law has been based.
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The stability of the law has been guarantee~ by this
doctrine. The laws by which our people are governed
have thereby becon1e fixed, definite and certain, and we
have been able, in the conduct of our affairs, to rely upon
the law as established, until such tiine as a court of
competent jurisdiction, in the exercise of its wisdom,
has determined that the over-all welfare of mankind
required a change in the law.
By its decision in this case, however, the Court has
not determined that intersection law should be changed,
but has apparently found that the law has become too
difficult to apply to the shifting factual situations presented for determination. It is proposed that the cardinal
principle of adherence to judicial precedent be abandoned,
and that each case be decided without attempting to fit
the decision into the judicial edifice constructed by our
courts over the years. The cases shall be decided, says
the Court, without any attempt to "reconcile the same
by apology for, explanation of, or nice distinction
between" earlier decisions. If, as stated ·by the Court,
''disharmony'' exists in the decisions, it is difficult to
see how the proposed plan of action will restore harmony
to the scene, because each case will announce its own
principle, and become its own precedent.
Under this decision, neither the Bench nor the Bar
of this state will be able to determine the rights of
principals in an intersection case, since such rights will
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necessarily depend upon the ultimate analysis of each
case by this Court. As the opinion of the Court indicates,
''minds differ'' and there are ''characteristic differences
in point of view.'' As the personnel of the Court shifts
and changes in the passage of time, the effect of this
decision will be to cause the determination of legal rights
to depend, not upon the structure of the law, but upon the
composition of the Court-upon the "differences in
point of view'' of the Justices (or Judges) who sit in
judgment upon each individual case.
During the course of preparation of this Petition
and Brief, Counsel has received numerous inquires from
other members of the Bar, who ask if, under the facts
of this case, the decision of the Court should be interpreted as overruling these leading intersection cases
which have heretofore guided the Bench and Bar in the
daily practice of their profession: Bullock v. Luke, 98
Utah 501, 98 Pacific (2d) 350; Hickok v. Skintner, 113
Utah 1, 190 Pacific (2d) 514; Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah
276, 193 Pacific (2d) 437; Gren v. Norton, ________________ Utah
----------------, 213 Pacific ( 2d) 356.
As we understand these inquiries, members of the
Bar are confused because the Court, while not expressly
repudiating the cited cases, has indicated that their
effect is to be minimized, and that, in the future, each
case will be decided by the Court on the basis of its own
facts, without regard to the question of whether or not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
the conduct of the litigant~ confonned to the standards
previously laid down as law.
To illustrate the problem, this question has been
posed: if an aeeident occurs involving two vehicles which
collide upon an intersection not protected by traffic
control::', with clear visibility available to each driver
for a considerable distance, are the parties to be held
to the principle of BuUock v. Luke, supra, or will be the
case be examined upon its facts, and a jury allowed to
speculate as to whether or not one or the other of the
drivers Ina de a ''mistake in judgment'' or in some other
way is to be excused from the consequences of his conduct~ We confess our inability to answer such a problem
upon the basis of the decision in the instant case, and
we respectfully request that the Court furnish its guidance to members of the Bench and Bar upon this subject.
The Court notes, in its decision, that the ''fallibility
of humanity" may provoke error and injustice as each
case is analyzed. It is submitted that this statement
furnishes one of the strongest possible arguments against
the policy of disregarding precedent. To stand by precedent is to guard against human fallibility. There can
be no stability in the law if it is to be decided, not by
the Court, "·hich is a perpetual instrument of justice,
but by the differing minds of the Justices who may, from
time to tirne, cmnprise the Court. As is stated in 14
American Jurisprudence, Courts, Sec. 61, p. 285, "parSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ties should not be encouraged to . . . speculate on a
fluctuation of the law with every change in the expounders of it.''

CONCLUSION
Respondent sincerely urges that, on the basis of
the foregoing argument, and in view of the importance
of the questions inherent in this case, the Court should
grant a rehearing and reargument and that the Court
should thereupon review the entire matter, and upon
such review, it is our sincere conviction that the Court
will feel compelled to find that the trial court was not
arbitrary in its decision and that its decision should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

SKEEN, THURMAN, WORSLEY & SNOW
JOHN H. SNOW
Attorneys for Respondent,
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